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InTroDucTIon
From 2001 through 2008 the United States experienced a period of climate wars: politics vs. science, business vs. government, and states vs. the federal government. 
By early 2009 some of these conflicts started to move toward 
resolution through legal action, 
scientific advances, and shifts 
in business strategies. Deci-
sions made today will deter-
mine whether a new era of 
climate protection begins or 
the climate cold wars continue. 
Business as usual is not in our 
nation’s best interest and every 
effort must be made to end the 
period of continued infighting 
between business and govern-
ment, federal-state conflicts, 
and denial of the root causes of 
climate change. This paper reviews several of the climate wars 
from 2001 to 2008, describes their historic context, and looks at 
lessons learned for the future. 
oRigin of the climate waRS
For decades scientific uncertainty and the cost and regula-
tory approach of addressing global climate change have been at 
the root of the climate debate. When in 1983 the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (“EPA”) published a report evaluating 
the effectiveness of specific energy policies to reduce green-
house emissions (“Can We Delay a Greenhouse Warming?”), 
responses from Congress, business, and federal agencies were 
highly polarized.1 A sense of urgency among some Congressio-
nal leaders emerged in 1986. “Deeply disturbed” by the implica-
tions of published reports on carbon dioxide (“CO2”)-induced 
climate change, Senators Chafee, Stafford, Bentsen, Duren-
berger, Mitchell, Baucus, Leahy, and Gore began to pressure the 
White House to take action on climate change. 
While the United States wavered on actions to address 
climate change, the United Nations Environment Programme 
(“UNEP”) was committed to initiating international and domes-
tic actions to reduce greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions. UNEP 
had a clear sense of purpose and in 1985 called for a legal con-
vention on climate change and began to lead international sci-
entific efforts to establish the foundation for negotiating such an 
agreement. As discussed later, this effort had a major impact on 
the U.S. climate debate.
When candidate George H.W. Bush took office in 1988, 
he declared: “Those who think we’re powerless to do anything 
about the greenhouse effect are forgetting about the White House 
effect. As President I intend to do something about it.”2 But Pres-
ident Bush may have underestimated the underlying economic 
challenges. After EPA Adminis-
trator William Reilly briefed the 
cabinet on climate change and 
the prospect for an international 
climate convention, he reported 
to EPA officials3 what he had 
heard at the briefing. Despite 
growing agreement among cli-
mate modeling groups, White 
House chief of staff John Sununu 
declared that the climate models 
were fundamentally flawed and 
that the best atmospheric scien-
tists had yet to become involved 
in climate research. Office of Management and Budget direc-
tor Richard Darman called the concept of a climate convention 
“clean air for the whole world.” Council of Economic Advisors 
(“CEA”) chairman Michael Boskin advised the president that an 
international treaty on climate change was a “bet-your-economy 
decision.”
Listening to the above advice would scare anyone worried 
about destabilizing the U.S. economy. But, in the end, President 
Bush supported the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (“IPCC”) as a way to address the division among 
scientific viewpoints. Later he also supported the development 
of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (“FCCC”) 
that in turn led to the development of the Kyoto Protocol.
In the 1990s and during the Clinton Administration simi-
lar debates over science and economics continued. During the 
subsequent Bush Administration (2001–2009) these debates 
became more of a series of wars between politics vs. science, 
business vs. government, and states vs. the federal government. 
*Dr. Alan D. Hecht is the Director for Sustainable Development, Office of Research 
and Development of the U.S. Environment Protection Agency (“EPA”). From 
2001 to 2003 while on detail from EPA, Dr. Hecht served as Associate Director 
for Sustainability at the Council of Environmental Quality (“CEQ”). Previously 
he was director of the U.S. National Climate Program from 1982 to 1989 where 
he was instrumental in launching the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(“IPCC”).
Decisions made today will 
determine whether a new 
era of climate protection 
begins or the climate cold 
wars continue.
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My review of several of the confrontations during this period 
suggests a written or unwritten strategy aimed at: 
 • Avoiding new federal legislation and regulations. This 
meant not allowing CO2 to be identified as a pollutant under 
the Clean Air Act or as an endangerment to human health. 
One approach used to prevent legislation was to emphasize 
the uncertainty in the science of climate change.
 • Doing nothing to hamper economic growth. The sluggish 
economy didn’t need extra burdens on business. Instead, 
federal actions promoted voluntary programs on climate 
change, many of which have 
helped to slow the growth of 
greenhouse gases.
 • Doing nothing until China, 
India, and other developing 
counties commit to reduce 
GHG emissions. The United 
States walked away from 
both the intention of the 2002 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Pro-
tocol largely based on eco-
nomic considerations. 
At the beginning of 2009, 
many of the conflicts surrounding 
climate change are moving toward 
resolution and the time may be 
at hand to resolve long-standing 
conflicts over regulations and economic impacts and launch a 
new era of energy-climate policy. While legitimate policy dif-
ferences remain, as evidenced by different approaches advanced 
by leading economists like Sir Nicholas Stern4 who argues for 
immediate action on climate change and William Nordhaus who 
proposes a modest and slower response,5 steps to resolve differ-
ences must be based on a different federal-business and federal-
state-local government model. Business as usual is not in our 
nation’s best interest. 
This paper will examine several of the most significant 
recent climate wars and their historic roots and suggested future 
actions. Given the current economic recession, now more than 
ever new government and business partnerships and close coop-
eration with non-government conservation, environmental, and 
economic groups are needed to help the public understand the 
economic and social costs of dealing with climate change, stim-
ulate the economy, create a broader energy portfolio, mitigate 
and adapt to climate change, and advance a new business and 
foreign policy agenda. 
resIsTIng ghg regulaTIons:  
The 2001 g-8 meeTIng
During the 2000 presidential campaign, candidate George 
W. Bush promoted legislation to “require the mandatory reduc-
tion in U.S. of emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, 
mercury and carbon dioxide from power plants.” 6 Many observ-
ers saw this as a significant departure from past history and 
were optimistic that a new era of climate change would begin. 
Unfortunately, the campaign promise in 2000 was reversed in 
March 2001 following an international conference among the 
G-8 countries. The reversal, a surprise to the newly appointed 
EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman, was a clear indi-
cation of behind-the-scene concerns about energy policy, eco-
nomics, and government regulations. 
At a meeting of the G-8 industrial countries in Trieste, Italy, 
Governor Whitman announced that the United States was com-
mitted to regulation of GHG emissions. Whitman assured her 
counterparts that the United States wanted a mandatory cap on 
CO2 emissions. The Joint Com-
muniqué expressed an inter-
national commitment to “take 
the lead by strengthening and 
implementing national pro-
grams and actions, to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, as 
well as to promote and dis-
seminate environmentally 
sound technologies and prac-
tices and renewable energy 
sources.”7 
Unfortunately, Adminis-
trator Whitman was unaware 
of a behind-the-scenes effort 
led by Senators Chuck Hagel, 
Jesse Helms, Larry Craig, and 
Pat Roberts to reverse this commitment. In a letter to the presi-
dent, these senators made clear their view that the commitment 
was unwise. The letter attracted the attention of Vice President 
Cheney who, according to Barton Gellman, embarked on a plan 
to “walk the president away from his promise.”8 Cheney’s staff 
prepared a four-page memo “that would put the White House 
on record against the collective judgment of the world’s climate 
scientists.”9 The memo said Bush should be nudged toward the 
position that the “current state of scientific knowledge about 
causes of and solutions to global warming is inconclusive. 
Therefore it would be premature at this time for the president 
to propose any specific policy or approach aimed at addressing 
global warming.”10
The President accepted this approach and signed a letter 
responding to the senators that was prepared by Cheney’s staff 
and given to the President (by Cheney) without any consultation 
across the government, especially with Governor Whitman. In a 
White House press release the president said: “I do not believe, 
however, that the government should impose on power plants 
mandatory emissions reductions for carbon dioxide, which is not 
a ‘pollutant’ under the Clean Air Act.”11
Chief of Staff Josh Bolten ultimately assumed respon-
sibility for the president’s reversal, asserting that he had been 
in error: the intended designation for CO2 was “emission” not 
“pollutant.”12 Underlying such a distinction was fear of estab-
lishing a legal basis for regulating CO2. After Bolten’s admis-
sion, Vice President Dick Cheney agreed, arguing that putting a 
cap on CO2 “was bad energy policy.”
13 
Underlying the opposition 
to CO2 regulation was 
the critical issue of the 
supposed economic 
impacts that would result 
from regulating CO2 and 
who would pay for it.
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Underlying the opposition to CO2 regulation was the criti-
cal issue of the supposed economic impacts that would result 
from regulating CO2 and who would pay for it. The Bush admin-
istration’s priority for economic growth was clearly evident in 
all policy actions. A key chapter of the Economic Report of the 
President submitted to Congress in 2002 focused on the cost of 
environmental regulations. Recognizing the significant achieve-
ment of the past decades in reducing the most obvious risks 
to health and the environment, the report states, “there is evi-
dence that further improvements in air quality would improve 
health and reduce mortality, but these improvements might be 
extremely expensive.”14 
Risk and cost-benefits analyses were key factors driving 
public policy in 2001 through 2008. Regulating emissions that 
affect climate change was recognized as potentially very valu-
able but not as an immediate priority in light of the cost and 
questions about the potential risks. “We are uncertain about 
the effect of natural fluctuations on global warming. We do not 
know how much the climate could or will change in the future. 
We do not know how fast climate change will occur, or even 
how some of our actions could affect it. Finally, it is difficult 
to say with any certainty what constitutes a dangerous level of 
warming that must be avoided.”15 
Fearing the economic impact of any climate legislation, 
promoting scientific uncertainty and denying global warming 
became the operating plan for many business and government 
leaders. 
promoTIng scIenTIFIc uncerTaInTy: 
challengIng The 2001 anD 2007  
Ipcc assessmenTs
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) 
has become the world’s preeminent scientific body assessing 
the impacts of and proposing options for responding to climate 
change. A key element of its 2001 assessment was its statement 
on the growing evidence for human-induced climate change.16 
And one specific diagram—later termed the “hockey stick”—
was ultimately to cause considerable angst among policy mak-
ers. What is the IPCC? What are its assessments? And how does 
this relate to domestic energy policy?
In 1985 UNEP, in cooperation with other international 
organizations and non-government organizations, organized a 
conference and prepared a scientific assessment of the impacts 
of climate change.17 UNEP Executive Director Moustafa Tolba 
sent the report to then Secretary of State George Schultz urging 
the United States to take appropriate policy actions on climate 
change and to launch negotiations on a climate convention. The 
State Department passed the letter to the National Climate Pro-
gram Office (“NCPO”) and its senior interagency policy board 
to draft a response. (The NCPO, created within NOAA by Con-
gress as a coordinating body among all federal agencies, was 
mandated to develop a climate action plan. From 1982 to 1989 I 
was the director of NCPO, which was later replaced by the inter-
agency Global Change Research Program.) 
The NCPO policy board, which included all relevant fed-
eral agencies, vigorously debated the merit of the report. The 
U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”) representative argued that 
it was inadequate, in part because it had no government sanc-
tion. DOE vocally insisted on a government-led international 
scientific assessment. At the same time, EPA and the Depart-
ment of State representatives supported the idea of a convention 
on climate change and suggested that perhaps it was timely for 
governments to prepare an international scientific assessment, 
especially in light of conflicting scientific evidence. During the 
debate, I offered a consensus proposal where the United States 
would support an international government-led scientific assess-
ment and would agree to international negotiations if the serious-
ness of the problem were affirmed. For different reasons, each 
agency agreed to the proposal. At a time when it was difficult to 
get interagency agreement on any action, there was agreement 
around the concept of an international scientific assessment. 
The action of the NCPO Policy Board eventually led to the 
U.S. proposal for “an intergovernmental mechanism” to conduct 
a government-led, scientific assessment of the climate change 
issue.18 This “mechanism” later became the IPCC, which con-
tinues today as the preeminent global scientific court on climate 
change. In the end, the IPCC report confirmed the seriousness of 
the climate problem and triggered the beginning of negotiations 
for a climate convention. 
Back to the climate wars—because of their relevance to 
policy, the 2001 and 2007 scientific assessments came under 
intense scrutiny. One figure in the 2001 report triggered par-
ticularly intense reaction. This report drew on data from a 1998 
publication by Michael Mann, Raymond Bradley, and Malcolm 
Hughes that reconstructed temperature patterns over the past 
1000 years (“MBH98”).19 The controversial graph depicted a 
sharp rise in temperatures over the past 100 years, which the 
authors attributed to human activity. The graph, with its “hockey 
stick” pattern, was a key piece of supporting evidence in the 
2001 IPCC report. 
Mann, who has been an author of the IPCC report, testi-
fied before Congress in 2003 that: “It is the consensus of the cli-
mate research community that the anomalous warmth of the late 
20th century cannot be explained by natural factors, but instead 
indicates significant anthropogenic, that is human influences.”20 
Nevertheless the underlying scientific methods used by MBH98 
were criticized by other authors who challenged the evidence 
that the sharp rise in global temperature was being caused by 
human activities.21 
The hockey stick became an element of the climate war 
when, in June 2003, Representative Joe Barton of Texas, the 
Republican chairman of the Committee on Energy and Com-
merce, requested that Mann provide responses to eight detailed 
questions related to his credentials and past work.22 The Sub-
committee ultimately asked the National Academy of Science 
(“NAS”) to review the issue, and NAS formed a committee of 
twelve scientists to assess the main areas of uncertainty, the prin-
cipal methodologies used, any problems with these approaches, 
and how central the debate is to the state of scientific knowledge 
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on global climate change. In the end, the NAS report agreed that 
there were statistical shortcomings in the analysis but concluded 
that the conclusions were in fact correct. 
Considering that the essence of the scientific process is peer 
review and reproduction of results, why was this an issue for a 
Congressional oversight subcommittee? Who or what was the 
real focus of this debate? Two objectives seemed to underlie this 
debate: to dispute any claim of human-induced climate change 
and hence any need for legislation; and to challenge the IPCC 
process and its current and future credibility by showing it relied 
on publishing flawed papers. 
In 2001, the IPCC assessment scientists concluded that it 
was “likely” (which it defined as with a greater than sixty-six 
percent probability) that climate change was caused by human 
activities.23 Six years later, the 2007 report raised the probability 
of human influences on climate to “very likely” (indicating a 
probability greater than ninety percent) and detectable in obser-
vational records.24 This stronger conclusion reflected a great 
deal of scientific progress made over the intervening years, both 
in direct observations of the impacts of climate change, and in 
computer modeling. Nearly all scientists have concluded that 
current trends could not be explained without including human-
related increases in greenhouse gases. While the 2007 report 
strengthened the consensus among most scientists and govern-
ments, a number of critics argue either that the report was too 
conservative or too alarming. 
Using scientific uncertainty to undermine support for cli-
mate legislation was further advanced by reliance on an obscure 
law known as the Federal Data Quality Act (“FDQA”).
regulaTIng scIence by lawsuITs on  
DaTa QualITy
FDQA, a little-known rider to the 2001 Consolidated Appro-
priations Act, directed the director of the Office of Management 
and Budget (“OMB”) to issue government-wide guidelines that 
“provide policy and procedural guidance to Federal agencies 
for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, 
and integrity of information (including statistical information) 
disseminated by Federal agencies.”25 The law requires that any 
scientific document issued by the government include clearly 
supportable data and any uncertainties related to the topic. It was 
approved without any congressional hearings. Many businesses 
supported the Act as a means to reign in regulation perceived to 
be unsupported by science. Environmentalists criticized its pas-
sage and predicted it would be used to stop regulations aimed at 
protecting public health and the environment.
The first lawsuit to be filed under the FDQA asked the gov-
ernment to cease dissemination of the 2000 U.S. National Assess-
ment of the Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and 
Change. The 2003 suit filed by the Competitive Enterprise Insti-
tute (“CEI”) against President Bush asked the federal courts to 
order the White House Office of Science Technology and Policy 
(“OSTP”) to withdraw the assessment report. The suit asserted 
that data in the Assessment was derived from “demonstrably 
inaccurate computer models, and dissemination of historical 
temperature data that it modified to inaccurately omit the occur-
rence of recognized climatic periods. This Act prohibits Defen-
dant from disseminating data failing to meet its standards.”26 
The CEI claimed that the assessment failed to meet the DQA’s 
scientific standards for objectivity and utility, because two of the 
models used “are incapable of providing reliable predictions.”27 
Understanding this morass requires some history. In 1990, 
Congress enacted the Global Change Research Act that required 
the preparation of national climate assessments.28 The Act 
established the United States Global Change Research Program 
with the aim of understanding and responding to global change, 
including the cumulative effects of human activities and natural 
processes on the environment, to promote discussions toward 
international protocols in global change research, and for other 
purposes. The Act requires “on a periodic basis (not less fre-
quently than every 4 years)” the preparation of an assessment 
report to the President and Congress that among other things 
“analyzes the effects of global change on the natural environ-
ment, agriculture, energy production and use, land and water 
resources, transportation, human health and welfare, human 
social systems, and biological diversity,” and “analyzes current 
trends in global change, both human-induced and natural, and 
projects major trends for the subsequent 25 to 100 years.”29
The National Assessment Synthesis Team (“NAST”) a 
federal advisory committee, consisting of experts from govern-
ment, universities, industry, and non-governmental organiza-
tions prepared the first of these assessments completing it in late 
2000. Using results from two different climate models, the team 
developed two different but plausible scenarios of future climate 
change and evaluated their environmental impacts. 
Considering the potential impact of climate change on the 
United States, NAST leader Michael MacCracken’s staff sent 
the report to every state governor. Ironic as it may be, then Texas 
Governor George Bush responded, “Thank you for your letter 
and the enclosed copies of your assessment about the potential 
consequences to the U.S. of a climate change. I appreciate the 
work that went into preparing this information.”30
The 2000 Assessment Report, completed before the enact-
ment of the FDQA, became the foundation for the U.S. annual 
report to the UN on climate change required under the 2002 
UNFCCC. The third U.S. report in 2002, based on the 2000 
assessment report, concluded: “Greenhouse gases are accumu-
lating in Earth’s atmosphere as a result of human activities, 
causing global mean temperature and subsurface ocean tempera-
tures to rise. While the changes observed over the last several 
decades are likely due mostly to human activities, we cannot 
rule out that some significant part is also a reflection of natural 
variability.”31
This conclusion, which seemed at odds with federal policy, 
prompted The New York Times science writer Andrew Revkin to 
report (June 3, 2002) “[i]n a stark shift for the Bush administra-
tion, the United States has sent a climate report to the United 
Nations detailing specific and far-reaching effects that it says 
global warming will inflict on the American environment. In the 
report, the administration for the first time mostly blames human 
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actions for recent global warming. It says the main culprit is the 
burning of fossil fuels that send heat-trapping greenhouse gases 
into the atmosphere.”32
Perhaps recognizing that the U.S. Report to the UN inter-
preted in this manner was setting a foundation for possible future 
regulatory action, President Bush dismissed the U.S. report by 
saying it had been put “out by 
the bureaucracy.” 33 Recogniz-
ing the potential legal impli-
cations of the U.S Report, the 
rationale for the CEI lawsuit 
becomes clearer. On August 
6, 2003, CEI filed a lawsuit 
against the Administration to 
invalidate the 2000 National 
Assessment of the Potential 
Consequences of Climate Vari-
ability and Change that formed 
the basis for many of the con-
clusions in the Climate Action 
Report. 
Amid Congressional inves-
tigations of possible White 
House promotion of the initiation of the lawsuit, the lawsuit 
was ultimately withdrawn after the White House Office of Sci-
ence and Technology Policy (“OSTP”) acknowledged that the 
National Assessment on Climate Change had not been subjected 
to the FDQA guidelines.
The use of the FDQA as a tool in the war on science is not 
over. In August 2008 the U.S. Chamber of Commerce asked the 
government to withdraw the Second National Climate Report 
that argued that it is “likely that there has been a substantial 
human contribution to surface temperature increases in North 
America.”34 The Chamber argued that the report contained 
unpublished data that made it difficult to assess its scientific reli-
ability. The Bush Administration settled the dispute by inserting 
a disclaimer that the National Report was not subject to FDQA 
guidelines.
The war on science is likely to continue, but specific actions 
could go a long way toward restoring the independence and 
integrity of scientific assessment by rescinding the FDQA and 
any executive orders that provide political oversight of science, 
such as the controversial Executive Order 13422, which requires 
that “[f]ederal agencies should promulgate only such regula-
tions as are required by law, are necessary to interpret the law, 
or are made necessary by compelling public need, such as mate-
rial failures of private markets to protect or improve the health 
and safety of the public, the environment, or the well-being of 
the American people. In deciding whether and how to regulate, 
agencies should assess all costs and benefits of available regula-
tory alternatives, including the alternative of not regulating.” On 
February 4, 2009, President Obama repealed EO 13422.35 
Peer review—not lawsuits—is the underlying framework 
for evaluating science. This traditional process allows critical 
examination of new ideas and theories and forces scientists to 
defend their work. One critical element of peer review needed 
for policy makers is estimating scientific uncertainty. Translat-
ing science into policy is well illustrated by the IPCC. While 
the IPCC reports are designed to reflect scientific consensus, an 
IPCC policy summary is a document prepared for policy mak-
ers. Reflecting governments’ concerns, the IPCC process was 
designed to allow governments 
to review and approve a sum-
mary for policy makers while 
being faithful to the underlying 
science. Although a good deal of 
climate change science is funda-
mental physics, a large portion 
of the impacts of climate change 
reflects modeling that may 
include uncertainties in extent 
and timing.
Although the negotiations 
and approval of the policy sum-
maries by governments can be 
torturous, the IPCC process has 
been successful in both preserv-
ing integrity and forging consen-
sus among governments and scientists. This process underscores 
that there is some discretion in how scientists and policy makers 
can communicate the significance and the need for action. The 
situation was less clear in 2003 when EPA was finalizing its first 
Draft Report on the Environment (“RoE ”). 
eDITIng epa’s 2006 DraFT reporT on  
The envIronmenT
The EPA RoE, launched in 2001 by Governor Whitman 
aimed to give the public a snapshot of the quality of the U.S. 
environment and to establish a set of indicators or metrics to 
measure improvements (or declines) over time. One contentious 
issue was the chapter on climate change. Initially, the Chairman 
of the White House Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) 
argued that such a chapter was not needed since so many other 
climate reports were available. It was later recognized that an 
EPA RoE without a chapter on climate change would not be 
credible. 
The interagency review of the chapter on climate change 
was heated. (From October 2002 to June 2003 while on detail 
as CEQ Associate Director for Sustainable Development, I was 
given the task of helping resolve interagency disagreements.) 
Flagging the chapter’s section on climate change, White House 
staff noted: “This section should be thoroughly reviewed for 
content and usefulness of that content. The section ‘What are 
the contributions to climate change . . .’ is not balanced and 
virtually ignores any mention of natural variability . . . . If this 
cannot be balanced, it needs to be removed.” Office of Manage-
ment and Budget staff commented to CEQ Chief of Staff Philip 
Cooney on March 4, 2003, “Phil, I don’t know whether you have 
reviewed the Climate Section of the EPA report, but I think you 
and Jim [Connaughton] need to focus on it before it goes final. 
The war on science is 
likely to continue,  
but specific actions could 
go a long way toward 
restoring the independence 
and integrity of  
scientific assessment.
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Even though the information is generally not new, I suspect this 
will generate negative press coverage.”36 
While the review was underway, CEQ’s chief of staff was 
promoting a new paper by Willie Soon and Sally Baliunas that 
contradicted published accounts of historic climate trends. The 
Soon-Baliunas paper asserted that it was an authoritative review 
of the literature and concluded: “that the 20th century is prob-
ably not the warmest nor a uniquely extreme climatic period of 
the last millennium.”37 Shortly thereafter, thirteen of the authors 
of papers cited by Soon and Baliunas refuted the Soon-Baliu-
nas interpretation of their work and contradicted “thousands of 
papers that go into a document like the IPCC report.”38
Four versions of the RoE climate change chapter went back 
and forth between CEQ and EPA, which was finally instructed 
to take the changes or leave it. On May 23, 2003, after several 
days of internal EPA discussions, EPA Administrator Whit-
man yanked the chapter from the report. This war is one of sev-
eral described in the House Oversight Committee’s review of 
 science editing. Two years later on June 8, 2005, a similar inci-
dent of heavy CEQ editing of a NOAA report was described in 
The New York Times. On March 19, 2007, Chairman Connaugh-
ton and Chief of Staff Cooney of CEQ testified before Congress 
and defended their editing as necessary to make the final report 
consistent with published literature. The hearing highlighted the 
role of policy-makers distorting or asserting their own interpre-
tation of scientific results. In the IPCC policy-makers summary 
that governments negotiate, all scientists must agree with the 
changes thus preventing any government from distorting the 
results.
The hearing failed to invite the one key witness whose 
judgment ultimately decided the fate of the report. In the end it 
was the EPA administrator (and former Republican governor of 
New Jersey) who decided that the revised chapter should not be 
included. Administrator Whitman said in effect that the chap-
ter—as edited—would diminish EPA’s credibility as an envi-
ronmental agency. EPA staff advised Whitman that the benefits 
of removing the chapter “were that it would provide little con-
tent for attacks on EPA’s science and that it may be the only way 
to meet White House and EPA needs.”39 
sTaTes vs. FeDeral governmenT:  
a supreme courT DecIsIon
In 1999 the International Center for Technology Assess-
ment, the Sierra Club, Greenpeace, and other environmental 
groups petitioned the EPA to regulate and set limits for CO2 and 
other GHGs emitted from new motor vehicles, arguing that such 
action was EPA’s duty under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act. 
The petitioning groups’ central argument was that CO2 was a 
pollutant and that its impact on global warming was negatively 
affecting human health and the environment. EPA failed to 
respond to the petition within three years, leading to a lawsuit 
brought by the environmental groups in 2002.40 
Subsequently, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maine filed 
a petition in June 2003 arguing that by failing to regulate CO2 
EPA was violating its mandatory duty under Section 108 of the 
Clean Air Act. EPA denied the petition arguing that the Clean 
Air Act did not authorize the agency to issue mandatory regula-
tions to address global warming, and that even if the EPA did 
have such authority, the agency believed it would be neither 
“effective or appropriate” to establish GHG emissions standards 
for motor vehicles at this time.41
After EPA denied the petition to regulate CO2, a coalition 
of twelve states led by Massachusetts; the cities of New York, 
Washington, DC, and Baltimore; and thirteen environmental 
groups filed appeals in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia in October 2003.42 The three-judge panel 
faced three issues: the standing of the petitioners, EPA’s author-
ity to regulate GHG emissions, and the agency’s decision not to 
establish GHG standards for new vehicles. On July 15, 2005, the 
court of appeals issued three opinions in the case. Two of the 
judges agreed, although on differing grounds, to let stand EPA’s 
position that it lacked the requisite authority. However Judge 
David Tatel issued a lengthy dissent, agreeing with the Mas-
sachusetts position on all grounds. Following the petitioners’ 
request, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari direct-
ing the Appeals Court to forward the case record for its review; 
The Supreme Court heard arguments on November 29, 2006. 
Two important criteria are required to have standing to sue 
the federal government: that at least one petitioner must be able 
to show injury from an actual or imminent action traceable to a 
federal agency and that the injury is one that a court can address.43 
Hence the real underlying issue was whether the impacts of cli-
mate change on a state serve as justification for a suit in federal 
court. A positive finding on this question would mean any state 
could petition the federal government for national action.44
The Supreme Court decision affirmed that, “The harms asso-
ciated with climate change are serious and well recognized.”45 
Massachusetts declared that its harm includes prospective loss 
of coastline that would be caused by the rise in sea level result-
ing from global warming. Because EPA “does not dispute the 
existence of a causal connection between man-made gas emis-
sions and global warming,” and “EPA’s refusal to regulate such 
emissions ‘contributes’ to Massachusetts’ injuries,” the Plain-
tiffs satisfied the traceability requirements.46
Writing for the Court, Justice John Paul Stevens summa-
rized three important holdings: (1) As quasi-sovereigns, states 
are entitled to an elevated level of deference on standing issues; 
(2) CO2 and other GHGs are “air pollutants”; and (3) EPA’s 
reasons for not regulating GHG emissions were insufficient.47 
Four justices dissented (Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito), 
arguing that states did not have any special rights of status and 
that nothing the Court could do would address the injuries com-
plained of because “any decrease in emissions here will be over-
whelmed many times over by emissions increases elsewhere in 
the world.”48
In his assessment, Justice Stevens quoted climate scientist 
Michael MacCraken who argued that the harms associated with 
climate change are serious and well recognized. Also citing a 
National Research Council assessment, which EPA itself regards 
as an “objective and independent assessment of the relevant 
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science,” a number of environmental changes that have already 
inflicted significant harms were identified, including:
. . . the global retreat of mountain glaciers, reduction in 
snow-cover extent, the earlier spring melting of rivers 
and lakes, [and] the accelerated rate of rise of sea levels 
during the 20th century relative to the past few thou-
sand years [and] petitioners allege that this only hints 
at the environmental damage yet to come. According 
to the climate scientist MacCracken, “qualified scien-
tific experts involved in climate change research” have 
reached a “strong consensus” that global warming 
threatens (among other things) a precipitate rise in sea 
levels by the end of the century, and severe and irre-
versible changes to natural ecosystems.49
The Court’s decision changed the legal and political land-
scape. President Bush issued an Executive Order in May 2007 
that directed EPA and the Departments of Transportation, 
Energy, and Agriculture to coordinate in developing possible 
regulatory actions to address emissions from mobile sources 
contributing to global climate change.50 This is a complicated 
process requiring that the EPA assert that the carbon emissions 
endanger public health and welfare under the Clean Air Act. 
While it might seem that this federal-state battle is over, that 
is not the case. Battles between federal agencies, again reflect-
ing economic concerns, were clearly evident in an agency pub-
lic comment on the proposed greenhouse gas rulemaking under 
the Clean Air Act. Comments received from the Secretaries of 
Energy, Agriculture, Commerce, and Transportation—under-
scoring economic concerns—noted:
The EPA staff now has prepared a draft suggesting the 
Clean Air Act can be both workable and effective for 
addressing global climate change by regulating emis-
sions from stationary and mobile sources of virtually 
every kind. Our agencies have serious concerns with 
this suggestion because it does not fairly recognize the 
enormous—and we believe insurmountable—burdens, 
difficulties and costs and likely limited benefits of using 
the Clean Air Act to regulate GHG emissions.51
Consequently OMB advised EPA Administrator Johnson 
that: “The issues raised during interagency review are so signifi-
cant that we have been unable to reach interagency consensus 
in a timely way, and as a result, this draft cannot be considered 
Administration policy.” 52 EPA action to implement the Supreme 
Court decision has been deferred to the new Administration.53 
resolvIng The clImaTe war
The climate wars of the past decades between business and 
government and between federal and state governments have 
inhibited the convergence of four critical factors needed to 
address climate change: (1) advances in science and technology; 
(2) effective application of government regulations and policies; 
(3) adoption of green business practices; and (4) new foreign 
policy initiatives. Overcoming these conflicts requires a differ-
ent government and business approach. Federal interactions with 
business should include GHG regulations, market incentives, 
and collaborative programs; cooperation with state and local 
governments should focus on promoting alternate energy sys-
tems and mitigation and adaptation to climate change; and new 
foreign policies should highlight the need for an energy-climate 
economy, especially with China. 
The use of science as a tool in fueling the climate wars must 
end. Scientific consensus on human-induced climate change is 
now stronger than ever and efforts to undermine, edit, or oth-
erwise discredit scientific reports should end. The focus should 
be on the value of science in helping decision-makers make the 
right decisions. Now more than ever the interface of physical 
and behavior science and economics will be needed to rebuild 
the economy and move society toward more sustainable energy 
systems. Anticipating the importance of this goal, the 1998 
House Committee on Science argued in the report Unlocking 
Our Future: 
While acknowledging the continuing need for science 
and engineering in national security, health, and the 
economy, the challenges we face today cause us to pro-
pose that the scientific and engineering enterprise ought 
to move towards center stage in a fourth role: that of 
helping society make good decisions. We believe this 
role for science will take on increasing importance, 
particularly as we face difficult decisions related to the 
environment.54
Preparing for the presidential election in 2008, dozens of 
organizations prepared hundreds of recommendations for action 
by the new Administration. Overall all of these actions should be 
judged on how well they advance a consensus among business 
and government and end the climate wars of the past decades. 
Three strategic directions for future actions stand out and are 
detailed below.
new buSineSS anD goveRnment appRoacheS on 
Regulating gReenhouSe gaS emiSSionS 
Effective national climate regulations and policies are needed 
to mitigate GHG emissions. A key challenge for the new 
administration will be to launch a new era of government-
industry partnerships. 
Historically, industry has met every new proposed environ-
mental or health regulation with declarations of impending eco-
nomic disaster. In remarks following EPA’s creation in 1970 the 
director of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce warned of the poten-
tial collapse of entire industries from pollution regulations.55 
Given the current economic crisis in the auto sector, it is ironic to 
recall Lee Iacocca’s 1972 prediction (quoted by Thomas Fried-
man) that, “If EPA does not suspend the catalytic converter rule, 
it will cause Ford to shut down and would result in reduction of 
GDP by $17 billion, increase unemployment by 800,000, and 
decrease tax receipts of $5 billion all levels of government.”56 
U.S. electric utilities claimed that the cost of meeting the 1990 
Clean Air Act would reach $4–5 billion per year. But by 1996, 
utilities were actually saving $150 million per year due to the 
act. When EPA announced a phase-out of substances that dam-
age the ozone layer, many industries claimed that alternative 
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substances did not exist or were too expensive. In 1993, auto-
mobile manufacturers warned that regulation of chlorofluorocar-
bons (“CFCs”) would increase the price of new cars by up to 
$1,200. Just four years later, the industry admitted that costs of 
following the new rules had declined to as little as $40.57 More 
recently, studies by Roland Hwang and Matt Peak (as quoted by 
Thomas Friedman) “found that the target industries dramatically 
and consistently overestimate the costs that regulations would 
impose on them and dramatically underestimate the innovation 
they would inspire.”58 
In all of these cases the costs of complying with environ-
mental regulations were far lower than industry—and even 
government—estimated that they would be. More recently a 
second perspective on regulations has emerged emphasizing 
potential economic advantages. General Electric’s (“GE’s”) 
2005 “ecomagination” initiative launched the notion that “green 
is green.”59 The GE initiative is part of a broader greening of 
industry as demonstrated by interviews with dozens of key 
industrial leaders60 and a convergence of government and busi-
ness policies moving toward more sustainable behavior.61 For 
example, GE is one of a number of large companies that for the 
first time are energetically advocating national legislation to 
address GHG emissions.62 
The formation of the U.S. Climate Action Partnership 
(“USCAP”) and its proposal for GHG controls further illus-
trate the change of some company attitudes. USCAP mem-
bers include dozens of the world’s largest companies who now 
argue for a mandatory cap-and-trade program and market based 
incentives.63 
Broader support from industry for the USCAP’s business 
approach will depend on exactly how GHG regulations are for-
mulated and implemented. Many companies will want credit for 
their past carbon-reducing actions, many others will be looking 
for incentives before moving forward and many will want equi-
table economic impacts across all business sectors. USCAP’s 
member support for mandatory approaches to GHG reduction is 
at odds with historic business models. Smart business strategies 
will be needed to achieve that goal.
The costs of GHG reductions—and who will bear them—
have always been a concern for policy makers. In 2002, the Bush 
administration saw an economy with a meager 1.6% growth rate 
in GDP as the nation struggled to recover from bursting of the 
high tech bubble and the 9/11 attacks. Even by 2007 the U.S. 
GDP growth rate was only 2.2%. In response to declining hous-
ing markets, GDP growth projections of just 1.9% per year pre-
vailed in 2007. Today in 2009, with the U.S. and international 
economies adjusting to financial collapse in many financial sec-
tors, any scheme for taxing or capping carbon emissions will 
need to include energy-economic models such as those envi-
sioned by green business advocates. But despite a significant 
downturn in the economy, the time is right to launch a new era 
of government-business cooperation whereby GHG regulations 
and green energy initiatives both stimulate the economy while 
reducing GHG emissions, and protect human health and ecosys-
tems for ecological services. 
The new government-business strategy must include 
advancing new technologies, setting carbon limits, facilitat-
ing implementation of other new regulations, and creating 
new incentives for industry. Corporations must put aside tired 
refrains of resisting federal regulations as inherently anti-busi-
ness. Strong federal support to regulate existing GHG emissions 
and to support Research & Development on new technologies 
to reduce GHG emissions is essential. Incentives to do both can 
enhance economic competitiveness and protect the environ-
ment. Both government and business must see the role of envi-
ronmental regulations in a new light recognizing the fallacies of 
past actions. Both government and business, with support from 
non-government organizations and the public, must agree on the 
sense of urgency and work together to implement a new busi-
ness strategy. 
Given today’s economic downturn, former CEA chair 
Michael Boskin’s comment (cited earlier) that an international 
treaty on climate change was a “bet-your-economy decision” 
might in fact be right if viewed as a step toward economic recov-
ery and the launching of a new era of a green economy. 
feDeRal-State coopeRation on ReDucing ghg anD 
aDapting to climate change 
States and cities have been in the lead in developing policies 
to reduce GHG. Past federal-state conflicts need to end and 
new partnerships developed. 
Worldwide power generation is the largest GHG emitter 
generating nearly 10 billion tons of CO2 per year.
64 With over 
8,000 power plants (out of more than 50,000 globally), the U.S. 
accounts for about 2.8 billion tons of CO2 annually—about 
25% of worldwide emissions.65 The U.S. power plants that 
produce the most CO2 are all coal-fired and are located in the 
states with the largest GHG emissions (including the top five of 
Texas, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana).66 These states 
(and many others), through the use of renewable portfolio stan-
dards (“RPS”), are on the front lines in efforts to reduce GHG 
emissions.
Around the country many states are requiring utilities to 
provide specific amounts of power from renewable energy 
sources. Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia estab-
lished RPSs by mid-2007.67 By the same time, forty-seven states 
were engaged in state or regional energy planning, forty-one 
had established standards to allow rooftop solar systems and 
other distributed-generation technology to connect to the elec-
tric grid, ten had created energy-efficiency portfolio standards, 
and sixteen had implemented public benefit funds to support 
clean energy programs.68 According to a Pew Center review of 
state RPS  programs, while these standards range from modest 
to ambitious, “the use of renewable energy does deliver sig-
nificant GHG reductions. For instance, Texas is expected to 
avoid 3.3 million tons of CO2 emissions annually with its RPS, 
which requires 2000 megawatts of new renewable generation by 
2009. Increasing a state’s use of renewable energy brings other 
 benefits as well, including job creation, energy security, and 
cleaner air.”69 
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Public and investor support for renewable energy is growing 
as is evident by the 2007 $32 billion buyout of the Texas power 
company TXU Corp. by private equity firms Kohlberg Kravis 
Roberts & Co. (“KKR”) and the Texas Pacific Group. TXU had 
been battling environmentalists and others who had been work-
ing to prevent the company from 
more than doubling its fleet of 
coal-fired power plants in Texas. 
Opponents to the expansion 
claimed the new plants would 
drastically increase emissions of 
sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, 
mercury, and carbon dioxide. 
As part of their plan to purchase 
Texas electricity provider TXU 
Corp., Texas Pacific Group and 
KKR have agreed to terminate 
the applications for eight of 
TXU’s eleven proposed coal 
plants in Texas and will adopt a 
platform of initiatives that will 
significantly reduce the com-
pany’s environmental impact in 
Texas.70
A short time after the TXU buyout, Kansas became the first 
state to reject a coal-fired power plant solely because of poten-
tial impacts of climate change. Since then, the state has become 
ground zero for a nationwide battle pitting environmental con-
cerns against powerful economic and political interests. Kansas 
now faces legal actions to reverse this decision.71 
Initiation of RPS programs is not the only way that states are 
seeking to reduce GHG emissions and expand economic devel-
opment. Many states have petitioned the federal government for 
action on transportation fuel standards. On the basis of federal 
Clean Air Act provisions that allow California, subject to EPA 
approval, to set anti-pollution standards stricter than those of the 
federal government, the state petitioned EPA for a Clean Air Act 
waiver so that it could require stricter automobile regulations for 
carbon emissions. In December 2007, after the passage of fed-
eral legislation establishing national automotive fuel efficiency 
at 35 mpg, EPA denied the California petition.72 California and 
other states plan to appeal the EPA decision; more legal battles 
are likely in 2009 and beyond. 
Other actions by California underscore the business side 
of GHG reductions. Because of its early commitment to energy 
efficiency and renewable energy, California expected to develop 
nearly 95,600 new jobs and $21 billion in investment to manu-
facture the components of renewable energy systems.73 While 
such forecasts may be delayed by the current economic crises, 
they are nonetheless inevitable as the economy rebounds. Cit-
ies (in the United States and around the world) are also leading 
efforts to reduce GHG emissions. Members of the C-40 group 
of the world’s largest cities are committed to tackling climate 
change and have committed to investing over $1 billion to 
finance energy-saving measures in municipal buildings.74 
Looking ahead, federal-state cooperation must build on two 
key factors: (1) passing appropriate legislation and policies to 
coordinate and reduce GHG emission and (2) developing strat-
egies needed to adapt to climate change. These city and state 
actions highlight shifting environmental and economic base that 
is pushing the United States 
toward “a de facto national 
RPS through a tapestry of 
state-based programs.” 75 
These state actions are chal-
lenging the federal govern-
ment to find constructive and 
supportive ways to help. It is 
therefore not surprising that 
the bipartisan Presidential 
Climate Action Project has 
recommended the creation 
of “a federal-state partner-
ship with $1 billion annual in 
grants to states and commu-
nities to implement climate 
action plans, reform utility 
rates to encourage energy effi-
ciency, and adapt to climate 
change.76 Anticipating the need for federal-state cooperation, a 
new think tank has been launched at Georgetown University’s 
Law Center to develop policies and positions and recommenda-
tions related to state-federal issues. 
Federal-state partnerships must also focus on giving state 
and local leaders the information they need to anticipate and 
adapt to impacts of climate change. A better understanding 
of regional and local impacts of climate change is critical for 
effective decision-making. Given the projected IPCC business 
as usual scenarios for CO2 emissions and recognizing how long 
it might take to implement new mitigation strategies to reduce 
GHG emissions, adaptation may be the most immediate need to 
avoid potential serious impacts. Recognizing this, the National 
Research Council (“NRC”) in 2007 evaluated the many federal 
climate assessments and emphasized the need for better under-
standing of local impacts, better communication of scientific 
results, and more focus on social science issues.77 
These are important conclusions and should impact the 
scope and direction of federal research programs. As the NRC 
evaluation noted, “only $25 million to $30 million of CCSP’s 
[U.S. Climate Change Science Program] $1.7 billion annual 
budget is devoted to such research.”78 “In addition, few social 
scientists are in leadership positions at the participating federal 
agencies, making it difficult for CCSP to increase emphasis in 
this area or to establish links with the academic social science 
community.”79
The NRC report recognized the importance of communi-
cating scientific results to decision makers and urged a closer 
examination of the impact of climate change at regional and 
local scales.80 “More accurate models, better regional observa-
tions, and the development of impact scenarios will be required 
Federal-state cooperation 
must build on two key 
factors: passing appropriate 
legislation and policies to 
coordinate and reduce GHG 
emission and developing 
strategies needed to adapt 
to climate change.
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to improve predictions of how climate change will affect smaller 
spatial scales.”81 The preparation by CCSP of twenty-one sepa-
rate assessment reports prompted Pew Center Director Eileen 
Claussen to note that everything is fragmented “so we never 
get a clear picture.”82 Anticipating the extra financial burden on 
states, cities, and the general population necessary to regulate 
greenhouse emissions, decision makers at all levels are going to 
need a clear understanding of potential impacts.83
One recent EPA study highlights the economic impact on 
states of anticipating and adapting to climate change. Mun-
dane as it might be, wastewater-collection systems or combined 
sewer systems (“CSSs”) are major systems designed to collect 
municipal wastewater and storm water runoff. These systems 
are prevalent in older cities, particularly in the Midwest, the 
Great Lakes, and the eastern United States. These systems can 
overflow if they lack adequate capacity to transport the com-
bined volume of municipal wastewater and storm water during 
extreme or frequent storm events, resulting in combined sewer 
overflow (“CSO”) events. Current regulatory standards allow 
for four CSO incidents per year.84 With predicted enhanced pre-
cipitation patterns in the Great Lakes, this number of overflow 
events is likely to be exceeded. This is important because today 
states face the issues of how to strategically invest billions of 
dollars into developing more robust and sustainable urban water 
and wastewater systems. The answer is clearly related to devel-
oping an integrated urban sustainability approach that includes 
climate-change scenarios. EPA is currently assessing how such 
climate change can impact future urban water and wastewater 
systems. This kind of analysis is essential to help decision mak-
ers at state and local levels make better decisions. The above 
example underscores the impact of climate changes at state 
and local levels and highlights the need for a major infusion of 
research to better quantify potential impacts and the most appro-
priate adaptation measures. 
inteRnational coopeRation anD a new uniteD 
StateS-china paRtneRShip
Overcoming historical barriers between developed and 
developing countries will require new ways of identifying 
those barriers and proposing solutions. The timing may be 
right for a U.S.–China initiative targeting specific reductions 
of GHG emissions. Such a bilateral agreement would change 
the international landscape for climate negotiations.
The negotiations that led to the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change in 1992 were tortuous, as the developing nations 
blamed the rich nations for the existing problems and demanded 
compensation. But in the end an agreement was reached based 
on the principle of differential responsibilities among nations: 
each country would act according to its own needs but indus-
trial countries would do more than developing ones. The Kyoto 
Protocol set binding GHG emission reductions targets for thirty-
seven industrialized countries and the European Community. 
These targets averaged five percent below 1990 levels over the 
five-year period 2008–2012. Arguing that China, India, and 
other critical emitters should make firm commitments as well 
as the more industrialized countries, the United States did not 
sign the protocol, contributing to a stalemate that still exists. In 
a 2008 policy paper, China reiterated its position that developed 
nations have done the most damage to the planet historically 
and should therefore bear the most responsibility.85 Recogniz-
ing that its reliance on coal for energy makes GHG emission 
reductions especially difficult, China argues for the transfer to 
developing nations of high-technology equipment for reducing 
GHG emissions. 
While its economy today is in turmoil, China is expected to 
possess the world’s largest economy by 2050, followed by the 
EU, the United States, and India.86 As economic forces drive a 
good deal of the climate debate, it is clear that the United States 
and Chinese economies will shape future international agree-
ments. China already surpasses the United States as the greatest 
GHG emitter.87 Since more than fifty percent of global GHG 
emissions are produced by the United States, China, and the 
EU—with another fifteen percent coming from Russia, India, 
and Japan—these countries can effectively determine future 
global energy and climate policies.
Although the United States and other industrialized coun-
tries bear historic responsibility for existing GHG concen-
trations, as Joshua Bushy notes, China “will be increasingly 
fingered as a climate culprit in the future,” potentially creating a 
common interest between the United States and China in avoid-
ing global condemnation as “climate villains. Today’s economic 
and environmental stresses present an opportunity for mutually 
reinforcing, positive outcomes if the United States and China 
help each other tackle immediate environmental problems and 
longer-term GHG emissions. A creative U.S.-China energy and 
security policy could benefit both countries.” 88
China’s leaders know that their nation’s current path is not 
sustainable and are keenly aware of the need to advance science 
and technology and to develop a green economy. China recog-
nizes the public health benefits of reducing GHGs and air pollut-
ants (such as sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and fine particles). 
Citing data obtained from Chinese officials, Elizabeth Economy 
and Kenneth Lieberthal report that environmental degradation 
and pollution cost the Chinese economy the equivalent of ten 
percent of its GDP annually—as much as US$36 billion from 
lack of water to run factories, US$13 billion from the degrada-
tion of health impact of acid rain, and US$6 billion from the 
spread of desert regions.89 
It is also apparent to China’s leaders that the impacts of cli-
mate change within China could exacerbate internal political and 
social stresses and hence tend to undermine the nation’s political 
stability.90 Not only is China in transition from being a develop-
ing to becoming a developed nation, but it is also moving from 
a centrally directed economy to one strongly driven by market 
forces. In the words of Economy and Lieberthal, Chinese offi-
cials have the daunting task of shifting “from a planned socialist 
economy to an entrepreneurial market economy while maintain-
ing one-party rule.”91 
For the United States, a bilateral agreement with China 
could serve to foster other cooperative actions among developed 
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and developing nations while helping to avoid potential trade 
and other economic conflicts. But if not handled wisely, climate 
change could be a source of serious U.S.-China conflict. Joshua 
Busby has pointed to relevant strategic issues: “A climate bill 
currently before Congress would allow the president, if he or she 
deems a country’s climate efforts to be inadequate, to impose 
tariff-like fees on carbon-intensive imports such as steel begin-
ning in 2019. Such legislation, if passed, would probably be used 
against China, adding to existing frictions over trade, intellectual 
property, and the level of China’s currency.”92 
Given the available benefits for both the United States and 
China, what strategy would best serve the United States? Jona-
than Wiener has recently argued that the United States should 
appeal to China’s national interest as the best way forward in 
advancing a new partnership.93 Wiener argues that demanding 
that China fulfill a perceived moral obligation to limit its GHG 
emissions would be ineffective, and that the United States would 
be wiser to emphasize China’s own interests—the possibility of 
reducing climate change damages to itself and its allies, securing 
public health benefits from reducing air pollution, and avoiding 
domestic political upheaval that may be associated with extreme 
climate events.94
A new U.S.-China partnership should therefore first focus 
on actions and new technologies that address a broad range of 
gases and pollutants that are both short-lived (days to weeks) 
and long-lived (years and decades) in the atmosphere and of gas-
ses that will likely contribute to greenhouse warming. Different 
GHGs impact the environment in different manners: for exam-
ple, the impact of methane on global warming is 62 times the 
impact of CO2 and that of nitrous oxide is 116 times that of CO2. 
Regulating these gases must therefore be a crucial aspect of any 
climate change strategy, especially for China. Based on data in 
EPA’s Global Anthropogenic Emissions of Non-CO2 Green-
house Gases report, in 2005, China’s estimated anthropogenic 
methane emissions ranked first in the world. Approximately 
twenty-five percent of its anthropogenic methane emissions—
209.9 MMTCO2E—come from agriculture (manure manage-
ment), coal mines, landfills, and natural gas and oil systems.95 
China is also the world’s biggest emitter of sulfur dioxide. 
According to China’s own data, coal and oil-fired power stations 
were responsible for twenty-five million tons sulfide dioxide that 
it discharged in 2005, contributing to acid rain that affected a 
third of the country.96 
Wiener suggests that these considerations point to an 
 ongoing shift in Chinese climate policy and to the possibility 
that an international climate treaty could offer positive incen-
tives to engage China in cooperative action. The United States 
thus has an opportunity and an imperative to engage China in 
what Wiener describes as “effective action on climate change 
through realist persuasion—appeal to global and national 
 interests, and global and national net benefits.”97 In political and 
 environmental terms, a new U.S.–China initiative with objec-
tives of developing and testing new technologies to control a 
wide range of pollutants and GHGs could advance new alter-
nate technologies, sharing the economic costs and benefits of a 
new strategy for climate and energy. With both countries poised 
to invest hundreds billions in economic recovery, the timing 
is right for mutually re-enforcing efforts on promoting green 
infrastructure. 
concluSionS
Future GHG emission and climate change scenarios are not 
optimistic. Global emissions of carbon dioxide grew at a rate 
of about 1.4% per year in the 1992 to 2002 time period. Recent 
data show an acceleration of emission: 3.3% in the 2000 to 2006 
period. China’s major expansion of its coal-fired power genera-
tion capacity has been the key factor in this unexpected accelera-
tion in growth rate. Looking ahead it is impossible to have an 
effective global mitigation program without a serious commit-
ment by the major economies like the United States and China.
If current emission trends continue at three percent per year 
for the next twenty-two years, the projected warming will yield 
a best-guess average warming, relative to 1990, of 1.8°C in 
2050 and 4.4°C in 2100. Since it is too late to prevent substan-
tial additional warming, the world community has no alternative 
other than to pursue both mitigation and adaptation approaches 
aggressively.
Effectively pursing a mitigation and adaptation strategy 
requires resolution of past climate wars. Fortunately many if 
not all of the climate wars of the 2001–2008 period are moving 
toward resolution. To be sure, the cost and methods of reduc-
ing GHG emissions will continue to raise contentious questions, 
especially in the current stage of global financial and economic 
distress. However, a positive vision of the future is possible: it 
would include enhanced support for technology research and 
development, collaboration between government and business, 
cooperation among different levels of government, and foreign 
policy initiatives that combine environmental concerns and 
economic goals to build an innovative and resilient economy. 
By taking such actions and ending the climate wars, the United 
States can lead the way to protect the world’s environment and 
stimulate the global economy. 
The author is grateful to Michael MacCracken, Rob Brenner, 
Frank Princiotta, Gordon Binder, Jonathan Wiener, and Edward 
Fallon for their helpful comments. 
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